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Book Review

From Polygamy to Peyote: What is the Proper
Role of Religion in American Political DecisionMaking?
Religion in Politics: Constitutional and Moral Perspectives
by Michael J. Perry
Oxford University Press (1997)
“Thou shalt not lie with mankind, as with womankind: it is
an abomination.”1
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .”2
I. INTRODUCTION
In the United States, in light of the Establishment and Free
Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment to the Constitution,
is it ever constitutionally proper for either a citizen or a legislator to make political arguments or decisions about homosexuality based exclusively upon the Bible’s teachings? Beyond the
constitutional context, is it ever morally proper to use the Bible
as a basis for a political decision about homosexuality? In Religion in Politics, Professor Michael J. Perry attempts to answer these questions by addressing two general issues: (1)
Given the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the
Constitution, what constitutionally permissible role, if any,
may religious arguments play, “in the United States, either in
public debate about what political choices to make or as a basis
of political choice,”3 and (2) What morally permissible role, if
any, may religious arguments play in the United States, “either

1. Leviticus 18:22 (King James).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
3. MICHAEL J. PERRY, RELIGION IN POLITICS: CONSTITUTIONAL AND MORAL
PERSPECTIVES 31 (1997).
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in public debate about what political choices to make or as a
basis of political choice?”4
Perry concludes that while it is constitutionally permissible
to present religious arguments in public debate, it is not constitutionally permissible to make a political choice based upon a
religious argument in the absence of a plausible secular argument that supports the same conclusion.5 Perry also addresses
what he terms the “morally” proper role for religion to play in
the United States. By morally proper role, Perry “mean[s] simply the role that, taking into account every relevant consideration (other than constitutionality), we should deem it permissible or proper for religious arguments to play in politics.”6 Perry
argues that it is not only morally permissible, but important,
that religious arguments be presented in public political debate, principally so that the religious arguments may be
tested.7 Further, Perry believes that it is morally permissible to
rely on a religious argument that all human beings are sacred,
even if no persuasive secular argument supports that claim.8 In
contrast, Perry concludes that in making a choice about the requirements of human well-being, it is morally impermissible to
rely upon religious arguments unless a persuasive secular argument would reach the same conclusion.9
This Book Review discusses Religion in Politics and, particularly, Perry’s treatment of the above stated issues. Part II
discusses Perry’s conclusion about the constitutionally permissible role of religious arguments in public debate or as a basis
of political choice. Part III discusses Perry’s conclusion about
the morally proper role of religious arguments in the same fora.
Part IV addresses the difficulty of applying Perry’s theory in
practice. Part V concludes that although Perry attempts to present a middle road between separationists and accommodationists, his book is nothing more than sugarcoated separationism.

II. CONSTITUTIONALLY PROPER ROLE OF RELIGION IN THE
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Id. at 3.
See id. at 6, 33.
Id. at 43.
See id. at 6, 44-45.
See id. at 6, 66-70.
See id. at 6, 76.
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UNITED STATES
Perry concludes that it is constitutionally permissible to
present religious arguments in public debate, but impermissible to make a political choice based upon a religious argument
in the absence of a plausible secular argument in support of the
same result.10 In explaining this conclusion, Perry states that
“free exercise forbids . . . tak[ing] prohibitory action disfavoring
one or more religious practices as such,” and “nonestablishment forbids . . . favor[ing] one or more religions as such.”11
Therefore, “to make a coercive political choice . . . that can be
supported only by a religious reason or reasons is . . . to impose
religion.”12 Nonetheless, Professor Perry concludes that “the
[First Amendment] is good news not just for the atheists and
agnostics among us; it is good news for us all.”13 This is because
the First Amendment limits the imposition of religious belief,
while at the same time protecting that belief.14
It is not at all clear, however, that the current state of First
Amendment jurisprudence accords with Perry’s assertion that
the First Amendment truly “is good news for us all.” Perry’s
theory that the First Amendment treats the religious and nonreligious equally assumes a “balanced” interpretation of the
First Amendment: it is acceptable for the Establishment
Clause to limit the religious believer’s reliance upon religious
arguments in support of political choices only if the exercise of
the religious believer’s beliefs is protected by the Free Exercise
Clause. Ten years ago, one constitutional scholar expressed
concern that the First Amendment was becoming unbalanced:
“[T]he establishment clause seems to be on the verge of swallowing the free exercise clause; it is as though the neutrality
commanded by the establishment clause constitutes a hostility
toward the freedom protected by the free exercise clause,” thus
leading to the danger that “the establishment clause might be
on the verge of becoming not anti-establishment, but simply
10. See id. at 6, 33.
11. Id. at 15.
12. Id. at 36.
13. Id. at 18.
14. See id. (“An important way to protect the freedom of those of us who count
ourselves religious to follow our religious consciences where they lead—especially the
freedom of those of us who are not politically powerful—is for the constitutional law of
the United States to forbid the politically powerful among us to act, in large ways or
small, in obvious ways or subtle, to privilege (‘establish’) their brand of religion.”).
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anti-religion.”15 As will be discussed, recent Supreme Court decisions have transformed that concern into reality.16 Because
there is no longer a “balanced” First Amendment, Perry’s theory that it is impermissible to rely upon religious arguments to
make political choices in the absence of an equally persuasive
secular rationale is strong medicine to the religious believer,
who becomes subjected to the full limitations of, but receives no
corresponding benefits from, the First Amendment.
In 1990 the Supreme Court, in Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith,17 upheld
against a free exercise challenge a generally applicable state
law, which criminalized the use of peyote.18 The law at issue
was used to deny unemployment benefits to members of the
Native American Church who lost their jobs because of their
use of peyote during church services.19 In Smith, the Court declined to apply the balancing test of Sherbert v. Verner,20 which
asks whether the law at issue substantially burdens a religious
practice and, if so, whether there is a compelling government
interest to justify the burden.21
The Smith Court wrote that “if prohibiting the exercise of
religion . . . is . . . merely the incidental effect of a generally applicable and otherwise valid provision,” the Free Exercise
Clause, without regard to whether the provision serves a compelling governmental interest, has not been violated.22 Further,
the Court held that any hardship suffered by religious believers
under generally applicable laws is simply an “unavoidable consequence of democratic government.”23
In so holding, the Court resurrected the Reynolds v. United
States24 belief-action doctrine that “[l]aws are made for the government of actions, and while they cannot interfere with mere

15. Stephen L. Carter, The Religiously Devout Judge, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
932, 937-38 (1989).
16. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997); Employment Div., Dep’t of
Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
17. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
18. See id.
19. See id. at 874.
20. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
21. See id.
22. Smith, 494 U.S. at 878.
23. Id. at 890.
24. 98 U.S. 145 (1879).
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religious belief and opinions, they may with practices.”25 This
doctrine conveys the message that “you are free to believe as
you like, but, for goodness sake, don’t act on it!”26 Further, the
belief-action doctrine has been criticized for “not [being] a line
that can provide real assistance” because if it were consistently
applied, the result would be consistent infringement of unquestioned First Amendment rights.27 The Smith Court concluded
that “government may not compel affirmation of religious belief
[or] punish the expression of religious doctrines it believes to be
false”;28 it will protect one and only one religious act: the act of
speaking.29
Perhaps recognizing the imbalance in the First Amendment
caused by Smith and its effects upon his interpretation of the
First Amendment, Perry feels that we should return to the “accommodationist” interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause.30
This interpretation holds that the “ ‘free-exercise of religion’ is
such an important value that government must not only not
discriminate against religious practice but must do what it can,
short of compromising an important public interest, to avoid
putting substantial impediments in the way of religious practice.”31 This “accommodation” would be accomplished by “exempting” religious believers from generally applicable laws,
when the government’s regulation interest is not very important.
The “accommodationist” view was essentially codified by
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), legislation that was enacted in response to Smith. RFRA prohibits
“[g]overnment” from “substantially burdening” an individual’s
25. Id. at 166.
26. STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: HOW AMERICAN LAW AND
POLITICS TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION 130 (1993).
27. PHILLIP B. KURLAND, RELIGION AND THE LAW: OF CHURCH AND STATE AND
THE SUPREME COURT 101-02 (1961); see also FREDERICK MARK GEDICKS, THE RHETORIC
OF CHURCH AND STATE 40 n.37 (1995).
28. Smith, 494 U.S. at 877.
29. To justify the result in Smith, the Court grasped upon a previously popular
idea: If the government were to allow exemptions from generally applicable laws for
those who claimed a religious belief, then false claims would overwhelm the courts, and
anarchy would follow. Interestingly enough, during the period from 1963 to 1990, when
the Supreme Court generally followed the Sherbert balancing test, there was no remarkable problem with false claims for exemptions based upon religious belief. See
GEDICKS, supra note 27, at 30, 40-41.
30. PERRY, supra note 3, at 30.
31. Id. at 28.
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exercise of religion unless the burden “(1) is in furtherance of a
compelling government interest; and (2) is the least restrictive
means of furthering that . . . interest.”32 RFRA applied to any
branch of Federal or State Government, to all officials, and to
other persons acting under color of law,33 and its coverage extended to “all Federal and State law, and the implementation
of that law, whether statutory or otherwise, and whether
adopted before or after [RFRA’s enactment].”34
Religion in Politics was published before City of Boerne v.
Flores, the 1997 decision wherein the Supreme Court found
that RFRA unconstitutionally exceeded Congress’s power.35
Flores leaves the future of RFRA uncertain, and casts a shadow
over the validity of the accommodationist interpretation of the
First Amendment. After Flores, it appears that the holding of
Smith constitutes the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the
First Amendment’s religion clauses, thus leading to the conclusion that the First Amendment is currently “unbalanced.” This
demonstrates the weakness of Perry’s argument that religion
should not form the sole basis for political decision making. If
religious believers must rely only upon persuasive secular rationales when making political decisions, then tens of millions
of Americans will be prohibited from demanding government
action in accordance with their consciences. At the same time,
any hardship suffered by these religious people under generally
applicable laws will simply be an “unavoidable consequence of
democratic government,”36 regardless of whether the law is
supported by a compelling government interest.
Contrary to both the Supreme Court’s holding in Zorach v.
Clauson37 and Perry’s assumption, the First Amendment now
favors those who do not believe in religion over those who do.38
As Stephen L. Carter has written:

32. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (1993).
33. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-2(1) (1993).
34. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-3(a) (1993).
35. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
36. Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890
(1990); see also GEDICKS, supra note 27, at 38; Carter, supra note 15, at 938.
37. 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
38. See id. at 314 (holding that the constitution does not have a requirement of
“callous indifference” to religious groups, and that the Court ought not to prefer those
who do not believe in religion over those who do).
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In a nation that prides itself on cherishing religious
freedom, it is something of a puzzle that a Communist
or a Republican may try to have his world view reflected
in the nation’s law, but a religionist cannot; that one
whose basic tool for understanding the world is empiricism may seek to have her discoveries taught in the
schools, but one whose basic tool is scripture cannot;
that one whose conscience moves him to doubt the validity of the social science curriculum may move to have it
changed, but one whose religious conviction moves her
to doubt the validity of the natural science curriculum
may not.39
III. MORALLY PROPER ROLE OF RELIGION IN THE UNITED
STATES
In addition to making a constitutional inquiry, Perry addresses the “morally” proper role for religion to play in the
United States. Perry argues that it is not only morally permissible, but important that religious arguments be presented in
public political debate, principally so that those arguments
may be tested.40 Further, Perry argues that, as a matter of political morality, it is permissible to “rely on a religious argument that every human being is sacred whether or not any intelligible or persuasive or even plausible secular argument
supports the claim about the sacredness of every human being.”41 Why? Because “the proposition that every human being
is sacred is a fundamental constituent of American moral culture” and it would therefore be “silly” to insist otherwise.42 Because this value is fundamental in nature, it is not subject to
the “demonstrated, ubiquitous human propensity to be mistaken and even deceive oneself about what God has revealed.”43
In contrast, Perry concludes that in making a choice about
the requirements of human well-being, it is morally impermissible to rely upon religious arguments unless a persuasive
secular argument would reach the same conclusion.44 Perry

39. Stephen L. Carter, Evolutionism, Creationism and Treating Religion as a
Hobby, 1987 DUKE L.J. 977, 985-86.
40. See PERRY, supra note 3, at 6, 44-45.
41. Id. at 69.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 75.
44. See id. at 6, 76.
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supports this limitation with the following line of reasoning:
“The paradigmatic religious argument about the requirements
of human well-being relies . . . on a claim about what God has
revealed”;45 therefore, “[g]iven the demonstrated, ubiquitous
human propensity to be mistaken and even to deceive oneself
about what God has revealed,”46 the absence of a persuasive
secular argument in support of a claim about the requirements
of human well-being fairly supports a presumption that the
claim is probably false, and that it is probably the defective
yield of that demonstrated propensity. If nothing else, it supports a presumption that the claim is an inappropriate ground
of political choice, especially coercive political choice.47
Perry’s theory is flawed for several reasons. First, rather
than being narrowly defined, the concept of “American moral
culture” is fluid and open to manipulation, depending upon
what argument the concept is used to support. For instance,
many would consider ideas about the traditional nuclear family
as “fundamental constituent[s] of American moral culture,”48
while others would consider those ideas “old-fashioned.” Following Perry’s reasoning, if one were endeavoring to support an
argument against homosexual marriage, for instance, she
would assert that the traditional nuclear family is fundamentally a part of American moral culture. Conversely, if one were
endeavoring to support an argument in favor of homosexual
marriage, she would assert that even if the traditional nuclear
family were at one time a fundamental part of American moral
culture, that is no longer the case.
Second, are we to interpret Perry’s theory as advocating the

45. Id. at 73.
46. Id. at 75.
47. See id. at 75. (“Moreover, as the American philosopher Robert Audi (who
identifies himself as a Christian) has explained, ‘good secular arguments for moral
principles may be better reasons to believe those principles divinely enjoined than theological arguments for the principles, based on scripture or tradition.’ This is because
the latter—in particular, scripture-based and tradition-based religious arguments—are
‘more subject than the former to extraneous cultural influences, more vulnerable to
misinterpretation of texts or their sheer corruption across time and translation, and
more libel to bias stemming from political or other nonreligious aims.’ (Christianity’s
acceptance of slavery comes to mind here—an acceptance that persisted for most of the
two millennia of Christianity.) Audi’s conclusion: ‘[I]t may be better to try to understand God through ethics than through theology.’ ”) (quoting Robert Audi, The Place of
Religious Argument in a Free and Democratic Society, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 677, 699
(1993)).
48. GEDICKS, supra note 27, at 17.
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view that if a political choice is based upon what one believes to
be a “fundamental constituent of American moral culture,”
then a persuasive secular argument in support of that political
choice is unnecessary? Take, for instance, those individuals
who cling for religious reasons, in the absence of persuasive
secular support, to elements of what they believe to be the
“American moral culture,” like monogamous, heterosexual
marriage. Are they not in the same posture as Perry with respect to his premise that all human beings are sacred?
Third, there is historical evidence that the “American moral
culture” has its roots in religion, or in what man believes God
has revealed. Perry’s premise that all human beings are sacred
grew in America from the religious belief that all humans are
sons and daughters of God, and as such, are brothers and sisters.49 As Frederick Mark Gedicks has observed, “nineteenth
century Americans generally believed that [religious] values
formed an important part of the moral foundation on which a
free and democratic society is built.”50 Further, “the Supreme
Court [has] quote[d] Chancellor Kent to the effect that ‘we are
a Christian people, and the morality of the country is deeply ingrafted upon Christianity’ . . . .”51 As Justice Douglas explained
in Zorach v. Clauson, “We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being.”52 If American moral culture has its basis in religion, then according to Perry’s reasoning, American moral culture is “the defective yield” of man’s
“demonstrated, ubiquitous . . . propensity to be mistaken and
even to deceive oneself about what God has revealed.”53 In light
of these problems with Perry’s theory, his exception should be
generalized with each individual, legislator, or government official allowed to rely upon the argument that seems best to
them, regardless of the existence or absence of an equally persuasive secular argument.

49. See PERRY, supra note 3, at 67.
50. GEDICKS, supra note 27, at 15 (citing 1 ALEXIS DE TOQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY
IN AMERICA 306 (Phillips Bradley ed., Vintage Books 1990) (“[Americans] combine the
notions of Christianity and of liberty so intimately in their minds that it is impossible
to make them conceive the one without the other.”).
51. GEDICKS, supra note 27, at 16.
52. 343 U.S. 306, 313-14 (1952) (emphasis added).
53. PERRY, supra note 3, at 75.
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IV. SELF-ENFORCEMENT
Even if Perry’s theory is sound, its application would be
practically impossible. Perry states that his ideal that people
refrain from relying on religious arguments in support of political choices, in the absence of an equally persuasive secular argument, “would have to be self-enforced.”54 But he concedes
that “it is inevitable that some legislators, and some citizens
participating in a referendum or an initiative election, will rely
on—will put at least some weight on—religious arguments in
voting for political choices.”55 Throughout his book, therefore,
Perry couches his theory in terms of it being an “ideal matter,”
or as one under which citizens, legislators, and public officials
should be “exceedingly wary” of relying on religious arguments
in the absence of a persuasive secular argument.56 By using
these terms, Perry acknowledges that his theory will be difficult to apply. A statement by Mark Tushnet further demonstrates this difficulty: “As far as I can tell, I am a Jew down to
the ground, and I cannot imagine a political decision that I
could make without reference, at some level of my being, to my
Jewishness.”57 It is likely that in the United States, where religious faith is more widespread than in any other nation in the
Western world,58 many individuals, legislators, and political
leaders are, like Tushnet, Jews, Catholics, Baptists, Presbyterians, Methodists, Mormons, Muslims, Buddhists, or believers
of an almost countless number of religious denominations,
“down to the ground.” When a Roman Catholic who believes
and follows Vatican decrees concerning the Church’s opposition
to the legitimization of gay marriage, abortion, and the death

54. PERRY, supra note 3, at 37.
55. Id. at 44.
56. Id. at 33, 66, 76, 83.
57. Mark Tushnet, Religion in Politics, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1131, 1131 (1989) (reviewing KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS AND POLITICAL CHOICE (1988))
(“People at all points on the political spectrum do in fact rely on their religious convictions in deciding to support or oppose expansion of public responsibility for the needy,
increases in public responsibility for inculcation of moral values in the young, and a
range of policies on abortion.”).
58. See Carter, supra note 15, at 939. According to recent studies, 95% of Americans profess a belief in God and 70% of American adults are members of a church or
synagogue. See PERRY, supra note 3, at 1; Book Note, 108 HARV. L. REV. 495, 498 n.21
(1994) (reviewing ELIZABETH MENSCH & ALAN FREEMAN, THE POLITICS OF VIRTUE: IS
ABORTION DEBATABLE? (1993)).
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penalty59 is asked to make political choices about these issues,
is it reasonable to think that she would disregard her religious
belief in making those choices? Steven L. Carter has addressed
this issue, arguing that religious faith is not something that
can be “shrugged off”; it is unreasonable to forbid those who are
religious “down to the ground” from relying upon religious arguments for political choices just because they have no persuasive secular reason to support that argument:
[This requirement] asks the devout citizen to become
another person, to abandon the most important aspect
of her life. No one would imagine asking her to leave
behind an arm or a leg in order to join her fellow citizens in their deliberations over policy; no one would ask
her even to abandon moral or political conviction. But if
her source of her conviction is faith, and if the faith is of
religious dimension, then she must transform herself
into another person—one who is not religiously devout.60
V. CONCLUSION
At the outset, Professor Perry presents his book as one
carving a path down the middle of the debate concerning the
proper place for religion in politics.
I have written this book as a Christian. In particular, I
have written it as a Catholic Christian thoroughly imbued with the spirit of the Second Vatican Council
(1962-65). But I have written this book as a Christian
who is extremely wary of the God-talk in which most
Christians (and many others) too often and too easily
engage . . . . Moreover, I have written this book as one
who stands between all religious nonbelievers on the
one side and many religious believers—especially theological conservative believers—on the other.61

59. See Pope Reiterates Stand Opposing Legitimization of Gay Marriages,
CHATTANOOGA TIMES & FREE PRESS, Jan. 22, 1999, at A10; Diego Ribadeneira, Pope
Exhorts America to ‘Defend Life’; John Paul Urges U.S. to Reject Abortion, the Death
Penalty, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 28, 1999, at A3; Larry B. Stammer, Cardinal Reiterates
Opposition to Abortion, Homosexual Acts, CONTRA-COSTA TIMES, Feb. 13, 1999, at A15.
60. Carter, supra note 15, at 940. (“Religious faith is not something that can be
shrugged off like an unattractive article of clothing. The very idea of devotion suggests
a way of ordering all life and all knowledge, including, although not exclusively, moral
knowledge.”).
61. PERRY, supra note 3, at 7.
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Further, Perry’s conclusion that it is acceptable to rely upon
religious arguments in making political choices, when an
equally persuasive secular argument exists in support of the
political choice, seems to balance the ideas of both religious
separationists and accommodationists.62 Perry also attempts to
demonstrate the neutrality of his rationale by explaining that
the limitation on the use of religious arguments to make political choices has little “practical significance . . . because there
will be plausible secular rationales for most such political
choices.”63 But in reality, his theory is little more than sugarcoated separatism. According to Perry’s theory, in the absence
of a persuasive nonreligious rationale, it is never permissible to
rely upon religious arguments when making a political choice.64
Based upon the current debates surrounding abortion, homosexual marriage, euthanasia, and public responsibility for the
needy, it is far from certain that plausible secular rationales
exist for political choices concerning these issues.
J. Nathan Jensen

62. See Audi, supra note 47 (separationist); Carter, supra note 15 (accomodationist); Mario M. Cuomo, Religious Belief and Public Morality: A Catholic Governor’s Perspective, 1 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 13 (1984) (separationist); Douglas
Laycock, Freedom of Speech That is Both Religious and Political, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
793 (1996) (accomodationist); William Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise
Revisionism, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 308 (1991) (separationist).
63. PERRY, supra note 3, at 36.
64. See Wendell L. Griffen, The Case for Religious Values in Judicial Decision
Making, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 513, 517-18 (1998).

